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"The Creation Myth in Plato's Tima eus" 
by Leonardo Taran
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the question whether the creation myth in 
Plato's Timaeus is to be taken literally or not. My reason for reopening the discussion 
is the recent publication by Professor Vlastos of a paper entitled "Creation in the 
Timaeus: is it a Fiction?" (l) In this paper Vlastos tries to answer the arguments 
that Professor Cherniss (2) gave in favor of the metaphorical interpretation, in the 
course of which arguments he attacked Vlastos' earlier article "The Disorderly Motion 
in the Timaeus1?. (3) My-reason for concentrating on Professor Vlastos ' papers is that 
his is the most recent and most complete statement of the question among those who con­
sider that the creation of the world was meant by Plato literally. (If) I have learned 
a lot from Professor Vlastos' arguments and my disagreements with his views should not 
be taken as implying lack of respect for them; Professor Vlastos is a scholar to whom I 
feel greatly indebted both from the scholarly and the personal point of view. I have 
learned many things from the many scholars who have argued for the metaphorical inter-, 
pretation of the creation of the universe in the Timaeus, but since Cherniss1 discussion 
is the latest, most complete and coherent presentation of this view, I shall take my 
point of departure from his treatment of the question, though here and there I shall 
refer to earlier discussions. (3)
The interpretation of the creation myth in the Timaeus is intimately connected with 
the problem of the origin of evil in Plato; since I believe, however, that it is neces­
sary to elucidate first the former problem, I will postpone a systematic discussion of 
the latter for another occasion. (6)
In the Timaeus, the myth of the creation of the world is part of another and larger 
myth: that of the victory of ancient Athens over Atlantis. The latter is brought about 
by Critias' desire to requite Socrates for the conversation held "yesterday," in the 
course of which Socrates had Shown the nature of the ideal state. (7) The purpose of 
the story of Atlantis is to identify the ideal state with ancient Athens and thereby 
satisfy Socrates' desire to see his ideal society in action so to say. (8) But before 
this can be treated in full, (9) it is necessary that Timaeus, an eminent philosopher, 
astronomer, and physicist, (10) should tell first the story that starts with the birth 
of the universe and ends with the nature of man. (11)
It seems, then, that the purpose of the creation myth is to give an account of the 
nature of man and of the universe to serve as the background for another mythical ac­
count, the purpose of which will be to show that the ideal state is superior and ulti­
mately more powerful than an adversary which has greater material resources and skill 
but is morally inferior. (12) That the purpose of the creation myth is to give a sys­
tematic account of the nature of man and the world rather than a chronological report 
of how the world came into being, is, I think, undeniable; this systematic character of 
Timaeus' exposition can be seen even in the three main divisions of his discourse. There 
is first a prelude (27 C-29 D) (13) in which the nature and the limits of the exposition 
are set down. (ll|.) Timaeus deals then with the work of the Demiurge and of the created 
gods (29 D-U7 E) which constitutes the work of Reason in the universe. At U7 E ff., 
however, he declares the need to begin all over again and introduces the third factor, 
the receptacle; this iS done in order to describe what comes about of Necessity (Ι4.7Έ- 
69 A). We hear now of things that the Demiurge had done before some of those described 
in 29 D-U7 E. (15) In the third and last part of the myth (69 A-92 C), after recapitu­
lating the two previous sections, Timaeus explains the creation of those things which 
are a result of the cooperation of Reason and Necessity. There is, I think, a .plausible 
reason for Plato's choice of this order of narration; (16) at present it is sufficient 
to notice that Plato gives a systematic account of, and is interested in, the two causes 
which are at work in the universe and that to give this systematic account he decided to 
do away with the chronological order, placing "first" what was chronologically "second."
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The systematic character of the creation myth in the Timaeus, with the consequent 
abandonment of the chronological order of creation, is sufficient to place it in a dif­
ferent category from other creation myths. By itself, however, the systematic character 
of the narrative does not yet imply that the creation of the world was not meant by Plato 
to be taken literally. But if we discover indications, in the Timaeus itself, that the 
creation was not meant to be taken literally, then we would be entitled to concluding 
that Plato purposely chose the form of a creation myth in order to give a systematic ac­
count of the nature of man and of the universe. (17) In that case, we should not put 
special emphasis, for example, in the fact that Plato speaks of a precosmical state of 
things or talks as if the universe was really created by the Demiurge; for Plato was a 
great artist and once he had decided to explain the nature of the universe in the form 
of a genetic myth he was naturally going to do whatever seemed necessary to preserve the 
likelihood of the creation myth. (18) What I mean to say is that the burden of the proof 
lies with those who claim that Plato did not intend the creation of the universe to be 
taken literally; but if we find as much as one clear indication in the Timaeus itself 
that Plato is warning the reader not to take the chronological account literally, or 
that he is pointing out a contradiction which would disappear if the creation is inter­
preted metaphorically, then we would be entitled to interpret the chronological account 
as a mean used by Plato to analyze the different factors and causes acting in the uni­
verse as it is. It is neither impossible nor unlikely that Plato may have decided to 
explain his conception of the universe through a creation myth; (19) that much, I think, 
should be granted by those who interpret the Timaeus literally. The discussion should, 
then, be centered on the arguments given to.show the metaphorical character of the 
cosmogony.
I
Thoiigh the order of creation is not followed in the narrative, it is legitimate to 
put together all that is said about it in the myth and thereby reconstruct the temporal 
order of creation. If, in doing this, we find contradictions, contradictions that could 
only be removed by a different order of narration which would entail a modification of 
Plato's account of a part of the universe, then it would be legitimate to conclude that 
Plato did not mean the creation to be taken literally, unless there were strong reasons 
to believe that he was unaware of the contradictions that the true chronological’ order of 
creation would introduce. In fact, one sufficiently decisive argument in favor of the 
metaphorical interpretation are the contradictions which would be patent if the true 
chronological order were followed in the account of the creation of the body and the 
soul of the universe. This argument is not based, as Professor Vlastos thinks, (20) 
only on the fact that the order of exposition does not follow the chronological order.
If this were the same ease as when a historian narrates in the order G,A,B, three facts 
that chronologically had the order A,B,C, Vlastos would be right in considering that 
this is not a valid argument to prove that the account of the creation of the body and 
the soul of the universe Should notT be taken literally. But if Plato himself calls atten­
tion to the fact that the order of creation is not the order followed in the narrative, 
and if we are able to show that, had he followed in the narrative the mythical order of 
creation, this would introduce contradictions which a different order of narration from 
the one chosen could not remove without changing the content of the account, then we would 
be right in contending that this proves the metaphorical character of the creation myth.(21)
Plato.describes first the creation of the body of the universe (22) and after this 
the creation of its soul. (23) But, before starting to describe the creation of soul, 
Timaeus explains that though in the narrative body is dealt with first and soul second, 
soul is really prior to body in birth.and excellence, the reason being that soul must be 
prior to body if it is to rule it. (2I4) The reversal of the "chronological" order of 
creation.is said to be due to the fact that "there is in us too much of the casual and 
random, which shows itself in our speech". (23) This "casual and random" must be under­
stood in the light of those "secondary causes" referred to in 1|6 E 1-6. (26) But it is 
clear that Plato could not have meant this explanation of the reversal suffered by the
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■ mythical order in the narrative to be taken literally* for he is himself warning us that 
the chronological order has been reversed and* consequently* he could have modified the 
* order of narration if he so wished. The reversal and the warning look* then* as a con­
scious device to call attention to the fact that "prior" and "posterior*" or "older" and 
"younger*" should not be taken in the temporal sense. (27) Moreover* when we read the para­
graph devoted to the creation of the soul we see one reason at leqst for the order chosen by 
Plato in his narrative. In 35 A 1-8, the soul is constructed as intermediate between the 
ideas and body* and as an intermediate it presupposes the extremes between which it is an 
intermediate; (28) from this it follows that soul cannot really be temporally prior to body.
(29) Consequently* if the account of the structure of soul and body given in Timaeus 31 
B-35 A is serious Platonic doctrine* soul and body must be contemporaneous (see also note 
U7); and, since soul is said to be "prior" and "older" than body* it follows that these words 
must refer to ontological and not to chronological priority. (30) Had Plato followed the 
mythical order of creation in his narrative he would have been forced to modify his account 
of the creation of the soul; the implications of the order of narration here are* then* in­
timately connected with the content of Timaeus1 discourse and cannot be compared to the' 
method of a historian when he chooses to give flashbacks to illuminate a later event.
J
II
There is in the Timaeus another device by which Plato probably meant to indicate 
that the creation;of the soul and the body of the universe should not be interpreted lit­
erally. This device consists in the omission* which must have been conscious as we will see* 
of a factor which* if openly mentioned* would destroy the likelihood of the creation myth. 
Both in the Phaedrus and in the Laws Plato maintains that the soul is self-motion and the 
source of all other motion. (31) I do not wish to discuss in this paper the argument that 
the soul as self-motion must be eternal; but even if Vlastos were right in his interpreta­
tion that in the Laws soul is a "created" entity* still even there the essence of the soul 
is said to be self-motion and because of this the soul is declared to be the source of all 
motion. (32) In the Timaeus there are several references to this notion that the soul is 
self-motion; (33) yet it is never openly stated that this is the essence of the soul and* 
significantly enough* all reference to self-motion is omitted from the psychogonia* the place 
where we would naturally expect Plato to mention it. I submit thqt the reason for this omis­
sion must be that* if self-motion were openly stated to be the essence of the soul* this 
statement would destroy any likelihood that the creation myth could have. Vlastos for his 
part asserts that there is no contradiction in the fact that self-moving, souls should be 
created; but if this were the case* why did Plato omit all reference to self-motion in the 
psychogonia?
Professor Vlastos* if I understand him correctly* would say that there is no omission 
at all; for in answer to another argument* that it is contradictory to have a soul create 
all the other souls* (3U) he maintains that we should distinguish between (A) the Craftsman 
generates self-moving souls and (B) he generates the self-motions of self-moving souls. 
Vlastos thinks that the Timaeus refers to the first alternative* not to the second. His 
argument is: "B is obviously self-contradictory* Since the very description of the motion
of a given soul as a 'self-motion1 entails* in Plato's scheme* that it is caused by just 
that soul and by no other individual in the'universe - hence* a fortiori, not by the Demi­
urge. But B is never mooted in the Timaeus, where the Craftsman creates souls and leaves 
them alone to do their own self-moving for ever after. How then could A* once it is clearly 
distinguished from B* involve a contradiction? What is there to keep the Demiurge (assuming 
he has the wonderful powers of world-creation) from creating entities that have the power of 
self-moving and* once created* go on to exercise this power to their heart's content?" (35)
But where does Vlastos find evidence for statement A? It is never said in the Timaeus 
that the Demiurge created a soul* or souls* and that afterwards they start to do their own 
self-moving. This is* then, an inference on the part of Vlastos* an inference prompted by 
the fact that the relation of the soul to self-motion is never openly stated* as we said.(36)
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■ Plato,, however, means that the soul is Identical with self-motion, not that it has the 
power of self-motion, as Vlastos says.(377” But even apart from this, there are passages in 
the Timaeus which definitely-point to B in regard to the world-soul and, a fortiori, for all 
souls. The first such reference oçcurs in the passage that we discussed in the previous sec­
tion, i.e. Timaeus 31 B-3i> A. After describing the creation of the body of the universe and 
after explaining why the Demiurge gave to it a spherical shape with neither eyes nor ears, 
neither hands nor feet, Timaeus says tjiat the Demiurge imparted movement to the body of the 
universe, "that one of the seven which above an belongs to reason and intelligence".(38)
But this motion imparted to the universe must be the motion of the world-soul (39) which, as 
we are told almost immediately, (1*0) was created before the body of the universe. Moreover, 
whereas in the psychogonia (1*1) there is no mention at all of self-motion or of any other 
motion that is proper to the soul, in 36 G-E the Demiurge, after "splitting" the soul into 
the circle of the Same and the circle of the Different, does the following things: he "en­
veloped" the circles with the motion that is carried around uniformly in the same place, (1*2) 
he "made" one the outer and the other the inner circle, (1*3) he caused the circle of the Same 
to move to the right and the circle of the Different to the left") (1*1*) he gave supremacy to 
the revolution of the Same, (1*5>) and the soul being inwoven with the universe and enveloping 
it on the outside "revolving within its own limit, made a divine beginning of ceaseless and 
intelligent life for all time." (1*6) All these actions of the Demiurge are incompatible 
with the voluntary self-motion of soul. (If7)
It follows, then, that if the Demiurge really created the soul of the universe he 
started also its self-motion. But why did Plato not say so openly? Because, I think, it is 
self-contradictory to state that.the Demiurge started the self-motion of the soul, as Vlas­
tos himself recognizes. On the other hand, Plato could not suppress all reference to self- 
motion, since this would falsify his teleological conception of man and of the universe. (1*8) 
Me are now able to discover one more reason for Plato's decision to relate first the creation 
of body; had he done otherwise he would have faced two alternatives which he could not accept:
(a) ëither to state openly that the Demiurge started the self-motion of the world-soul, or
(b) that he created a soul, attached it to a body created afterwards, and that after this the 
soul, by its own power, started its never-ending motion. The second alternative is Vlastos' 
interpretation; but the fact that Plato did not choose it and that he preferred instead to 
have the Demiurge "envelop" the soul with motion and impart motion to the body of the uni­
verse, a motion that is the movement given to the universe by its. soul, shows that Plato,
by calling attention to the reversal in the narrative of the chronological order of creation 
(with the explanation that soul must be "older" than body if it is to govern it, i.e. move 
it), meant to suggest to the reader that the creation should not be taken literally.
Plato was not trying to deceive his reader; he chose a genetic myth over a direct anal­
ysis of the causes at work in the universe (1*9) and, once he had chosen this form of exposi­
tion, he had to preserve the likelihood of the mise-en-scène. To reach the conclusion that
the creation of the universe should npt be taken: literally, it is not necessary that the
reader be acquainted with the Phaedrus (i>0) and the Laws ; for the notion that soul is self- 
motion is implied in the Timaeus, as is also the notion that the world-soul moves the uni­
verse. And, finally, the Timaeus states unambiguously that soul is primary causation as 
opposed to the secondary or "necessary" causes.(5>l) If Plato never openly states in the
Timaeus that the soul as self-motion is the ultimate source of all motion, it is not to
openly contradict what he said about the precosmical chaos, which is the symbol of the 
"necessary" causes, even as the Demiurge is the symbol of the intelligent causation of the 
self-moving soul.
i n
Plato declares that time and the universe came into being simultaneously, that no time 
existed before the universe and that none would exist if the universe were ever destroyed.(53) 
Yet events are described which took place before the creation of time. This looks like a 
contradiction, a contradiction of which Plato must have been aware, since he emphatically 
asserts several times that time and the universe are contemporaneous. These assertions can
«
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only be interpreted as a device to call the reader's attention to the fact that, as there 
was no time when the universe did not exist, neither the universe nor time ever came into 
being.
Vlastos, however, asserts that Plato, in Timaeus 37 D-38 A, speaks only of a time (U) 
which can be defined as uniform and measurable time-^flow, and he maintains that this is 
different from saying that the Demiurge introduced temporal succession, or time-flow as 
such,, into the world. The latter Vlastos calls time (S) and defines as irreversible temp­
oral succession. Vlastos maintains that this distinction would eliminate the contradiction 
mentioned above and, although he admits that Plato did not make this distinction, he asserts 
that what Plato says about time in the Timaeus shows that he did not deny the proposition 
that time (S) is instantiable in the absence of time (U). TFU") He then goes on to say: (55) 
"Nor is there any evidence that he (sc. Plato) had made the analysis that would have enabled 
him to do this by revealing how time (U) was both different from, yet related to, time (S).
He is perfectly capable, certainly, of thinking and speaking of time in other contexts in 
terms of the past/present/future distinction without specific reference to measurable time- 
flow: he does so in the Parmenides (l5l E-157 B). But there is no indication there, or
anywhere else, that he saw precisely how these two concepts are related. We Should do well 
to keep in mind that no one in antiquity succeeded in seeing this - not Aristotle, for ex­
ample, who wrote more extensively on time, kith greater analytical thoroughness, and with 
knowledge of what Plato had already contributed to the partial exploration of this difficult 
concept. "
I have italicized the last part of the quotation because I wish to emphasize that the 
distinction that Vlastos thinks so difficult to make was indeed made in antiquity; and I 
think that such a distinction would have been made by Plato if he meant even to leave open 
the possibility of a precosmic time. At any rate, the distinction between a precosmic time 
and a cosmic, "ordered," time is made by the Epicurean Velleius in Cicero's De Natura Deorum 
and, interestingly enough, the distinction is made in a passage where Plato's Timaeus is 
being criticized.(56) Moreover, Aristotle himself must have been aware of such a distinc­
tion, since he reports that whereas Plato held that both time and the world were created, 
all his predecessors held that the universe was generated, leaving time as ungenerated.(57) 
Whether or not Aristotle is accurate here in his report, there can be no question that he 
must have been aware of the distinction between precosmic and cosmic time. Moreover, even 
if Plato could not make such a distinction, if he really meant the creation to be taken lit­
erally, he would, like some of the Presocratics at least, have left time as ungenerated. His 
emphatic assertions that time and the universe were generated together,__that God created the 
heavenly bodies, in order that time may come into being, (58) and that ?jv and cavat "became 
forms of time", (59) can only be interpreted as his way of indicating to the reader that 
there was no time when the universe did not exist, i.e., the universe must have existed al­
ways . (3ÏÏ) These expressions, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, imply a deni­
al of the possibility of time (S) or precosmic time; (6l) unless we are willing to admit that 
Plato was unaware of the contradiction that his statements about time imply. A very unlikely 
prospect, I think; the more so, if we consider that these expressions were interpreted as 
contradictions in antiquity, both by those who, interpreting the Timaeus literally, attacked 
Plato,(62) and by those who, considering that these statements imply a contradiction (namely, 
"there was a time when time was not") (63)* considered that Plato tried to indicate that the 
creation of the world should not be taken literally. Neither Plato nor Aristotle distinguish 
a cosmic from a precosmic time because, believing that the cosmos is eternal, they did not 
need to make such a distinction.(610
IV
After creating soul, the body of the universe, the heavenly bodies, and the gods of 
traditional mythology, the Demiurge passes on the task of creating the other three kinds 
of living beings to the created gods.(65) It is then said of the Demiurge: και é μεν
δη ατΐαντα ταυτα διαταξας εμενεν έν τψ έαυτου κατα τρότΐον ηΘει. .(66) This is a refer­
ence to the doctrine that God is unchangeable; and Proclus already noticed that to be always
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* in the same state in: relation to the world the Demiurge must create always, if he creates 
at all (i.e. the universe must be eternal).(67) If the Demiurge created the universe at a 
certain time and then ceased creating, his relation to the universe must have changed.(68)
“* This doctrine that God is unchangeable is explicitly stated and explained in the Republic(69 ) 
and is in agreement with Plato’s conception of the divine as expressed in other dialogues.
Vlastos, however, says that ’’the constancy of God's ?jôoç would comport with any amount 
of world-making, provided only'his behavior as Craftsman remains consistent with his charac­
ter as god. In Rep. 381 C, the point of the statement that ’it is impossible for a god to 
wish to change himself but, as is only right, each of them being as fair and excellent as it 
is possible to be, abides for ever in his own character,’, is not that god does not act at all, 
but that he does not act in undignified and wicked ways: he does not lie,, masquerade, etc.,
like the Homeric deities; he never causes evil, only good (379 B-38O C). . Since the world 
creation is an act of supreme beneficence (30 A-B), itwmld imply no. shift of nature or 
character in this ’’best of causes” (29 A), but rather a fitting expression of it."(70)
But what Vlastos quotes from the Republic is only-381 C 7-9* and these lines a.re only 
the conclusion of the argument that shows that God must be unchangeable. Granting that in 
the Republic it is Plato's purpose to Show that God cannot wish to lie, masquerade, etc., 
how is this proved? It is proved by a.general argument the import of which is to establish 
that God, if he changes at all, must change for the worse, since he is as good and beautiful 
as possible.(71) T h i s  same doctrine is echoed in the Timaeus. If the Demiurge really created 
the world because he wanted everything to be as good as possible, since there is no φθόνος 
in the divine, (73) then, why, if this act of creation is good, did the Demiurge create the 
world at one time rather than at another? If God is good and he always possessed this power 
of creation, why did he allow the precosmic chaos to exist for some time before he decided 
to bring.order into it?(7li) If the creation is interpreted literally, it would imply that 
a change took place in the divine ?ΐθος from worse to better, a notion incompatible with 
what is said in the Timaeus about the Demiurge.
The notion of a god starting the creation of the world at a certain point in time pre­
supposes a divinity powerful enough to create his own values; but such a thing is incompati­
ble with Plato's conception of the divine. For Plato God, or a god, is soul (75) and as 
such it must be subordinated to the ideas. In the Euthyphro, undoubtedly an early work, it 
is said that the holy is loved by the gods because it is holy and not that it is holy be­
cause A.t is loved by the gods.(76) In the Laws, his last work, Plato asserts that there 
are OeTcu avaywatwhich bind even the gods and against which the gods do not and will never 
fight; (77) in fact, J.t is st condition for the existence of the divine the knowledge and 
practice of these ®ειαι αναγκαι .(78) The same thing is meant in the Phaedrus when the 
life of jbhe gods is described in mythical terms as the contemplation by NOUS of the 
ύττερουρανιος τοττος , (79) a contemplation that must be eternal, (80) since it is "contact” 
or ''closeness” to the ideas that makes a god divine.(8l) Only man searches and seeks wis­
dom, only man can be a φιλόσοφος; a god does not need to search, for he is already wise, 
as we are told in the Symposium (20U A). Even the heavenly bodies are considered to be 
divine because they do always the same thing (Timaeus, Laws), and this is considered the 
proof that they are alive and that their movement is voluntary. The nature of the Platonic 
god being what it is, he could not start .capriciously to create the world because this work 
of creation is good. If he creates, he must create always; and, since this is incompatible 
with what is expressed in Timaeus l\2 E 5-6, we must interpret the Demiurge as a mythical 
figure and as a symbol of the causes δσαι μετά νου καλών και αγαθών δημιουργοί .(82) If 
the Demiurge is mythical and is a symbol of intelligent causation, this would explain why 
the distinction between "God,” "the God,” and "the gods" is not maintained (83) after the 
created gods are introduced at i|.l A-D.
-7-
The use of the figure of the Demiurge is not restricted to the Timaeus ; we find it 
also in the Sophist (8k) and in the Politicus (85) (in the latter we also find the precos­
mic disorderly motion).(86) It cannot he a development in Plato's "later" works, since we 
* find it even in the Republic,(87) where it is said that the Demiurge fashioned the heaven 
and al 1 that it contains in the best possible manner ( ουτω αυνεσταναι τψ roo ούρανου δη- 
μιουργψ αυτόν τε και τα εν αυτφ ).(88) And even in the early dialogues δημιουργός is personi­
fied and applied to Rhetoric and to other τεχναι .(89) Aristotle himself, who certainly 
considered the cosmos to be ungenerated and imperishable, said that God made coming to be 
perpetual as the closest approximation to real being that is possible for sensible existence. 
(90) It is also to be noticed that Aristotle, who interpreted the Timaeus literally, pays no 
attention to the Demiurge.(91)
V
Have I not forgotten, however, what may be in fact the most important argument to assert 
that according to Plato the universe came into being? Is it not decisive that Plato himself 
says that the cosmos γεγονεν ?(92) Such has always been the claim of those interpreters who 
take the creation of the world in the Timaeus literally. Moreover, Hackforth,(93) followed 
by Vlastos,(9U) argues that the sentence in which Plato asserts that the universe has been 
generated, having started from an αρχή ,(95) is demonstrated (96) from premises which ex­
press serious metaphysical doctrine, with no metaphorical or mythological language at all.
The premises by which it is proved that the cosmos came into being are, according to Vlastos, 
(97) two: (1) it is corporeal and as such it is an object of sense perception and belief,
while (2) all such objects are in process of becoming and have been generated.
Zeller,(98) followed by Cherniss, (99) had objected to (2) on the ground that, if all 
that is visible must have come into being, this must also be true of the precosmical chaos; 
the latter is said to exist before the universe was created and as such it is said to have 
been visible.(100) Vlastos maintains that "Plato's cursory reference to the primal chaos 
in 3Ö A as 'all that was visible' is one of the most obscure of his. remarks about that all 
too obscure subject" and that it is contradicted by the assertion in 31 B 5 that nothing is 
visible unless it has fire in. it, "but chaos had only an inchoate antecedent of fire which 
did not have the nature of fire but only 'certain traces' of it (53 B 2). How and in what 
sense this would or could be 'visible' Plato does not explain." Consequently, according to 
Vlastos, this very silence would be enough for Plato to escape Zeller's charge of contradic­
tion, or at the very least it would not be a glaring contradition but, at best, an unexplained 
obscurity. Moreover, if Zeller's charge would be valid, "it would put Plato in the position 
of palming off on his readers falsehoods in the major premise and conclusion of our syllo­
gism. Believing that it is quite false that all objects of sense-perception and belief are 
generated, and also false that the world was generated, Plato would be making his mouth­
piece, Timaeus, assert the first and join it to a true premise to engender a.false con­
clusion." (101)
I do think, however, that Zeller's argument is valid; for it is a fact that Plato calls 
the precosmic chaos "visible" and, whatever may be the obscurities of Plato's conception of 
the precosmis chaos, if it is "visible," the reasoning of 28 B 7-C 3 would apply also to it. 
After all Plato might very well not give this information if it introduces a contradiction; 
or must one suppose that, even granting that Plato wrote that the precosmic chaos is visible 
inadvertently or without being able to see "clearly" the contradictions of such an obscure 
notion, he never re-read the Timaeus carefully before publication? If he wrote that the 
precosmic chaos is "visible" it must have been with full awareness of the implications that
this entails in relation to the reasoning employed in 28 B 7-C 3. ¥e must assume that he
called the chaos "visible" in order to make it clear that it was sensible. Fortunately 
there is more evidence to. support Zeller's thesis. Let us start by interpreting literally
28 A-C as Hackforth and Vlastos do. From 28 A I4.-6 and B 7-C 3 we may conclude that γενεσις
or anything that is a γιγνόμενον must ύτΐ^αίτίου τίνος εξ ανάγκης γενεσθαι . Now in
29 D 7-El it is said that God is the cause of genesis and of the universe. This genesis 
can be understood only as cosmic genesis, of which the Demiurge is the "father"; this is in
agreement with the reasoning in 28 A-C. But later on it is said that Beings space, and 
genesis existed even before the generation of the universe.(102) There can be no ques­
tion that this genesis, according to the reasoning in 28 A-C must have been "created" or 
must necessarily have a cause; but this would contradict the whole system of the Timaeus. 
Consequently, what Plato says about the precosmical chaos being "visible" and what he says 
about genesis introduces contradictions into the Timaeus, Is Plato, then, palming off 
falsehoods on his readers? I do not think so. My reason for this belief is that I con­
sider that to judge any part of a Platonic work we should first read the whole of it; after 
all, Plato is not writing a treatise on-mathematics or on logic. Many times Plato's works 
end in aporiae or contradictions and it seems to me that he leaves it to the reader to 
deduce by himself the implications of what is said literally in the work. The reasoning 
in 28 A-C is, I think, correct. If we read the Timaeus and we find in it contradictions 
of which Plato was conscious and which seem to have been purposely included to call the 
reader's attention to them, is it so strange to conclude that Plato is thereby indicating 
to the reader that the creation of the world should not be interpreted literally? If, after 
reaching this conclusion, we come back to 28 A-C we would naturally conclude that when Plato 
says that the universe "came into being" he meant only that it is "process," i.e., that the 
universe is always in the process of coming into being. There is no question that genesis 
and its derivatives can have this meaning and they were so interpreted by some in antiquity, 
in relation to this passage of the Timaeus .,(103) Plato 's point is, then, that the universe 
being a γενητόν must have a cause and!that this cause is νους and consequently soul. On the 
surface Plato seems to mean γεγονενίη the sense of something that came into being, not having 
existed previously; and this is only natural if he chose a genetic myth to explain the nature 
of the universe, a genetic myth with which Plato tried to illustrate by means of temporal 
succession the ontological structure of man and the universe.(10U)
We may now also give an answer for the systematic order of the Timaeus. Had Plato 
chosen to give a purely chronological account of the creation of the world, this would have 
falsified his teleological conception of the universe; had he introduced the third factor 
from the very beginning, it would have contradicted his purpose of showing that the causa­
tion of soul is "primary," for it would have been obvious that the Demiurge is limited by 
the precosmic chaos. Plato, then, chose the order of narration that would best exemplify 
his notion that soul is primary causation and that soul is "prior" to body. This being so, 
according to Í4.6 D-E, soul must be the ultimate source of all motion. The importance that 
Plato attributed to this notion can be seen in.the Phaedrus and in the tenth book of the 
Laws ; a teleological explanation of the universe in which soul would be shown to be the 
master of body is, after all, the desiderata of Socrates even in the Phaedo. Nobody 
succeeded so well in fulfilling this task as Plato himself in the TimaeusTÇlO!? )
N O T E  S
* 1. This essay has been published in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, edited by R. E. .
Allen (London, 1963)> pp.ii01-lj.19. Hereafter I shall refer to this essayas Vlastos, Creation.
$ 2. Cf. H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, vol.I, (Baltimore,
I9I4.U), pp.li21-ij.31; see also notes 3lIj7"”3ÏÏ973B2,. 38F7"Tïereafter I cite this work as Cherniss, 
I.
3· Originally published in Classical Quarterly XXXIII ( 1 9 3 9 pp.71-83· The article is 
now reprinted in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, pp.379-399» Since Vlastos has introduced 
some changes, I shall quote this paper from the Studies and will refer to it as Vlastos, 
Disorderly Motion. *37810
li. Hackforth's article "Plato's Cosmogony (Timaeus 27 D ff.)," Classical Quarterly, 
N.S.IX (1939), pp.17-22, the main argument of which has been accepted by Vlastos (Creation,
pp.J4O2-l4.03), will be discussed in section V.
3. For references to the more important earlier publications, cf. Cherniss, I, note 337.
ó. These publications are referred to and criticized by Cherniss in his article "The
Sources of Evil According to Plato," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 98
(193Ι|·)> PP-23-30. For publications later than 195Í4 see those mentioned by Vlastos, Creation, 
p .Jj.02, note 1.
7. Cf. Timaeus 20 D-26 D.
8. Cf. Timaeus 19 D-20 C, 26 C-D, 27 A-B ; Critias 110 C-D. See Cornford, Plato's 
Cosmology (London, 1937), PP· 2-8.
9« A summary is given in Timaeus 20 D-23 D.
10. Cf. Timaeus 20 A and 27 A.
11. Cf. Timaeus 27 A 3-6.
12. Cf. Taylor, Plato : Timaeus and Critias, translated into English with introductions 
and notes on the text (London, 1929), p.lOU.
13. Cf. Timaeus 29 D 3·
li;· On this, cf. section V.
13. Such is the "generation" of fire, air, water, and earth, out of which the Demiurge 
was said to have created the body of the universe.
. l6. See section.V.
17. Cf. sections, I, II, III, and IV.
18. I mention this in view of Hackforth's argument, accepted by Vlastos, that in Timaeus 
27 D 3-28 C 3 an argument is given which, being philosophically correct, would imply, if the 
creation was not meant literally, that Plato was deceiving his reader. I deal with this 
problem in section V.
19. He had used this device in the account of the four inferior constitutions in the 
Republic (3)4-3 C-376 B).
20. Cf. Vlastos, Creation, p . I4O6 .
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21. This is in fact the way in which the argument is presented by the defenders of the 
metaphorical interpretation;· ef.,- e.g., Cherniss, I, pp. I4.2I4.-5 .
22. Timaeus 31 B 5 ff. ?
23= Timaeus 35 A 1 ff.
25· Timaeus 31; B 10-35 A 1.
25. Timaeus 35 0 2-5. I have given Cornford's translation (Plato's Cosmology, p.59);
my translations of the Timaeus all come from this work.
26. Cf. Cornford, op.cit., p. 59, note 1.
27. The notion that soul rules and is the master of body is good Platonic doctrine (cf.,
e.g., Gorgias 565 C-D; Phaedo 79 E-80 A, 95 E; Laws 892 A, 896 B-C, etc.); but this notion 
does not require that soul be temporally “prior'· Id body. This is implied in the Timaeus 
itself (cf. notes 29 and 30). That Plato could use "prior" and "posterior" in a logical and 
ontological sense is shown also by Aristotle, Metaphysics 1019 A 1-5; though: this passage is
not a specific allusion to Timaeus 35 B-C, as Apelt (Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen
Philosophie [Leipzig, 1891.3, pp. 226 ff., especially p .228) thought, the distinction is here 
employed (cf. also Laws 892 C and 896 C). See Mondolfo, L'Infinito nel pensiero dell1 antich­
ita classical (Firenze, 1956), p.109, note, and Cherniss, I, note 33·
28. Even the description of the middle element as a "mixture" of the-two extremes is 
present in the psychogonia (see Timaeus 35 A 3-5, τρίτον εξ αμφοΤν έν μεαρ συνεκεράσατο 
ουσίας εϊδος). See Cherniss, I, note 33> last paragraph, and the references there given. For 
the interpretation of Timaeus 35 A-B, cf. Grube, Class. Philol. 27 (1932), pp.80-82.
29. The soul must be intermediate between the ideas and the body of the universe (cf. 
Timaeus 35 A 2-3, κα\ της αϊ ττερΊ τα σώματα γίγνομενης μερtστης ; 5-6,του τε άμερους αυτών 
κα\ του κατά τα σώματα μεριστού ); before the creation of the body of the universe there 
can be no bodies. if the soul were intermediate between,the ideas 'and the precosmic chaos 
(but cf. note 30), then: either the soul would possess disorderly motion (but there is no
mention in the Timaeus of disorderly motion in the soul, and, moreover, disturbance by sen­
sation is introduced later (53 A-55 B) and sensation is the result of the incarnation of 
particular souls (52 A) and of the rectilinear motion of vision (55 C); see Gherniss, I, 
note 315), or, if the "substraction" of the six motions in 35 A is interpreted to mean that 
the Demiurge did not need to impart motion to the body of the universe (but Plato says spe­
cifically that he did: 35 A Ι,άιϊένείμεν ; cf. section 'll), the mere substraction of the 
six wandering motions being sufficient to start the motion of the universe (as Vlastos once 
maintained: Disorderly Motion, p.396), this would imply that the intelligent motion of the
soul was already present in the precosmic chaos (cf. Cherniss, I, note 365).
3D. If we insist both in interpreting "older" and "younger" in the chronological sense 
and in the literal interpretation of the Timaeus, contradictions appear when we consider the 
relation of the Demiurge to the precosmic chaos. Both are uncreated; yet the Demiurge, if 
not mythical, must be a soul (cf. note 35) and as a soul he must be "prior" to body or sen­
sible existence and, at the same time, intermediate between sensible existence, and the ideas. 
(If he is a soul he must be constituted in the same way as that described in 35 A, even assum­
ing for the sake of the argument that the reference to sensible existence there is to the 
precosmic chaos [but cf. note 29].) At any-rate, the Demiurge, as soul, governs the precos­
mic chaos and imposes on it a certain order; yet the Demiurge cannot be temporally "prior" to 
the precosmic chaos; if it were, the Demiurge must have created it, but such a notion is in­
compatible with the Timaeus. (For another contradiction-if the Demiurge and chaos are taken 
literally, cf. section V.)
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31. Gf. Phaedrus 2b9 C-2U6 A; Laws 899 A-896 B. Vlastos now admits that in the Laws 
soul is the source of all motion (Disorderly Motion, p.396, note l), whereas he previously 
tried to reconcile the Laws with a literal interpretation of the Timaeus (cf.op.cit., pp.
* 397-399).
32. Cf. Laws 093 A-B, 896 A-B.
33- Cf». Timaeus 37 B 5, 77 C b-9, 89 A 1-3» The doctrine is also implied at Timaeus 
J4.6 D-E, where the causality of NOUS, and consequently of the soul (cf. note 3b) is declared 
to be primary.
3b· The Demiurge, if not mythical, must be a soul, since his work is that of NOUS (I4.7 
E 3-b) and NOUS exists only in soul (30 B 3 and 1|6 D 9-6) . Gf. Cherniss I, p..U25, and pp. 
603 ff.; this is accepted by Vlastos. What is said about the creation of the soul in 3ί|· B- 
39 A (cf. notes 28, 29, 30) shows that it is inconsistent to have the Demiurge create all the 
other souls. Moreover, whether the soul is "generated” or "ungenerated" cannot be an acci­
dental characteristic of it if the soul is self-motion (cf. below this same section); con­
sequently, if all the other souls were created by the Demiurge, this would introduce a 
contradiction in Plato's conception of the soul.
39· Cf. Vlastos, Creation, p. lpL6.
36. This is why Cherniss, I, p. U28, said that the passages quoted in note 33 are hints 
or veiled reminders of self-motion. These texts presuppose the notion of self-motion, but 
they do not discuss it nor do they state openly that this is the essence of the soul. But 
if the soul is self-motion and if its causality is "primary" (cf. I4.6 D-E), then, it follows 
that soul is the source of all motion and consequently the precosmical chaos cannot have been 
meant by Plato to be taken literally. This is why Plato avoided stating openly the identity 
of soul with self-motion, while at the same time giving enough indications that this is his 
conception.
37» This is precisely the point raised by the criticism of Aristotle which Xenocrates 
tried to answer (fragment 68 [Heinze]); but in doing so Xenocrates, as well as Aristotle, 
did not take into consideration the fact that Plato declared that the source of all motion 
must be.self-motion because motion cannot be analyzed into factors which are not motion (cf. 
Cherniss, I, pp. Ul2-I|.13 and note 366). This is why Plato, to "explain" motion, postulated 
the existence of a non-physical self-motion: the soul.
38. Cf. Timaeus 3b A 1-9, (n«b· A 2-3, των έτίτα την τίερΊ νουν καί φρόνησήν μάλίρτα oÜcíav)·
39· Since it is the soul that moves the body of the universe and the soul the one who 
possesses the "movement" proper to NQUS. (Cf. also 36 E, 37 A-C, 39 C, i+O A, 77 B-C, 90 
C-D). See also note 29.
1;0. Titaaeus 3b B 10-35 A 1»
Ul. Timaeus 39 A -36 B .
b2. Timaeus 36 C 2-3, καί *ίϊ κατά ταύτα εν ταυτφ ττερι αγόμενη κίνησει ττεριξ αύτας ελαβεν.
However one translates ελαβεν ττερίξ one is forced to conclude that either the Demiurge 
places the soul into a pre-existing motion and, therefore, the world-soul has no power to 
move itself, or that the Demiurge imparts motion to the self-moving soul. The third possi­
bility is that the creation of the soul was not meant to be taken literally (see also note 
b7 ) ·
b3 · Timaeus 36 C 3~b> καί τον μεν εξω, τον δ9 εντός έττοίεΤτο των κύκλων·
Ul*. Timaeus 36 C 3-7, την μεν δη ταυ του κατα πλευράν crû δεξ ια περί ηγαγεν, την δε θατερου 
κατα διάμετρον επ’ αριστερά ; cf. also the ''splitting*' of the circle of the Different 
into, seven circles having different speeds (36 D).
7
· Timaeus 36 C 7~D 1, κράτος δ’ εδωκεν τη τούτου κα\ όμοιου περιφορ?.
!|.6. Timaeus 36 Ε 2-3; that is, the soul, having been placed into its motion, is moving 
and, once it is interwoven with the body of the universe, makes a beginning of ceaseless and 
intelligent life (i.e., the life of the universe, a living creature composed of soul and 
body; cf. 30 B 1-C 1 and 3k B 8-9).
i+7- It is interesting to compare 3k B 3-9 with 36 D 8-E 3° In the first passage the 
Demiurge sets the soul in the body, while in the second he fashions the body within the soul. 
These two parallel accounts show that the fashioning of soul and body are contemporary and 
cannot have been meant literally since the Demiurge "created" first the soul and then the 
body of the universe. This double account when set against the warning given in 3k B 10-33 
A 1 leads to the conclusion that this passage, calling attention to the reversal in the narra­
tive of the mythical order of creation, is a hint to the reader not to take the creation 
literally.
Í48. After all Plato's purpose is to isolate and show the work of the two "efficient" 
causes in the universe (cf. especially U6 D-E and 69 A-B).
k9. Cf. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p .31, second paragraph. See also section V.
30. There is a striking reminiscence of the Phaedrus in I4I E ff. (cf. Cornford, Plato's 
Cosmology, p.liiij.). Though we cannot assume that Plato considers that the reader of the 
Timaeus knows the Phaedrus, this reminiscence may help us to understand what was in Plato's 
mind.
31. Cf. Timaeus 1*6 D-E: primary causation is that of NOUS, but NOUS can only exist in
a soul (cf. note~3E7.
32. I.e. that it was in disordered motion (cf. 30 A, 32 D ff., 62 B).
33« See, especially, Timaeus 37 C-38 C.
3U. Vlastos, Creation, pp. I4IO-UH.
33« Vlastos, op.cit., p. 1*13«
36. Cf.. Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.9.21: ...saecla nunc dico non ea quae dierum noctium- 
que numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non 
potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternítas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum 
metiebatur, spatio tarnen qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem 
cadit ut fuerit tempus aliquod nullum cum tempus esset. Why an Epicurean would distinguish 
a precosmic from a cosmic time is, I think, intelligible. Cf. also Proclus, In Timaeum, vol. 
Ill, p.37, 12-13 (Diehl): λεγουσι oi περί ’Αττικόν, οτι χρόνος μον ?jv και πρό ούρανοΰ 
γενεσεως, τεταγμένος δε χρόνος ουκ ^ν·
37 ° De Cáelo 279 B 12-13 : All say that the world has come into being, and some maintain 
that, having come into being, it is imperishable; in 280 A 28-32 the Timaeus is cited for 
this notion. Physics 23l B ll| ff.: all agree that time is ungenerated, except Plato who
generates it, since he makes it contemporaneous with the universe which has been generated.
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 ^ 58. Cf. Timaeus 38 C U, tva γεννηθώ χρονος.
59. Cf. Timaeus 37_E 3-38^1 2. Vlastos (Creation, pp. i|ll-l|.12) denies that Plato's 
£ statement implies that ?jv and carat can only be predicated of motion that proceeds in time.
He says: "To say that F and G come into existence as attributes of x when x comes into exis­
tence is uninformative as to any prior instantiation of F and G." But what Plato says about 
time and its “parts" is not a case of accidental predication as Vlastos' example is. Plato 
says (a) Time did not exist before the universe came into being; (b) ?jvand εαται are parts 
of time; the logical conclusion is that and carat did not exist before time and the uni­
verse were generated. This is precisely the place where Plato would have differentiated a 
precosmic from a cosmic time if he so wished; since he did not, we can only understand him 
as saying that there was a time when time was not; since this is a contradiction we must 
assume either that he did not see it or that he purposely insisted in it several times to 
call attention to the fact that the creation should not be taken literally. I can say "green 
and blue became predicates of grass and the sea when the latter came into being" and to this 
Vlastos' example would apply; but if I say "green and blue became predicates (or "parts") of 
color when color was created," I must mean that there was no instance of green and blue be­
fore color was created.
60. This is why time is called an "eternal image" of the ideal model at 37 D. 7·
61. I see no reason why Plato should specifically distinguish time (U) from time (S) 
only to deny that the latter exists. The assertion that the Demiurge generated time contemp­
oraneously with the universe "in order that, as they were brought into being together, so 
they may be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should come to pass" (38 B), is
a tacit denial of the possibility of a time (S).
62. So Aristotle and Eudemus. The latter said that Plato's definition of time (which 
he misinterpreted in the same way Aristotle did [ef. Gherniss, I, pp. i|17 f., and note 3k8]) 
is inconsistent with the existence of a precosmic motion since all motion is in time (Sim­
plicius, Phys., p.702, 2k-2 9 = Eudemus, fr. lj.6 [Spengel] = fr. 82 b [Wehrli]). For Aris­
totle's criticism, cf. note 6U·
63.
(Rabe).
Cf.., for example, Proclus, ap. Philoponus, De Aeternitate Mundi, pp. 103,l-10i|.,3
6I4.. Consequently, had Plato meant the creation of time to be taken literally, Aristotle1 s 
criticism (Physics 25l B 19 ff.), that time must be unlimited because it implies the instant 
which is the limit between past and future time, would be valid. Vlastos (Creation, ρ.1|Α·3 
and note 1 ) denies that there is a logical reason why time must extend infinitely into the 
past, and asserts that "if .it did not, one 'now' (the first)'would have no 'before'." We 
must take into consideration, however, that Plato himself was aware of the definition of 
"now" as the limit between past and future, since he uses it in the Parmenides (152 B-E).
At any rate, the notion of a first "now" which would have no "before" presupposes the exis­
tence of a creator, a notion to which Aristotle would not subscribe (therefore, his criticism 
at least is valid from his own point of view), which he does not attribute to Plato, and
:h is incompatible
65. Timaeus I4.I A





70. Vlastos, Creation, p .1+θ6. ^
71. Cf. Republic 38I B 8-C 10 (n.b« B 10^ -C 9?Ποτερον οδν έττι τδ ßcXftov τe καί κάλλιον Λ 
μεταβάλλει εαυτόν η έττι τδ χείρον κα\ το α’ίσχιον έαυτου} - * Ανάγκη, εφη, έττι τδ χείρον, ειττερ 
αλλοιουται» ου γάρ που ένδεα γε φησομεν τδν θεδν κάλλους *η αρετής είναι.·.- ^Αδύνατον άρα, 
εφην, κα\ θεφ έθελειν αύτδν άλλοιουν, άλλ* ώς εοικε, κάλλιστος κα\ αριστός fi5v εις τδ δυνατδν 
έκαστος αυτών μενει άει ¿τΐλως ¿y rfí αυτου μορφή). See Aristo tie. Metaphysics 1071+ B 25-27.
72. Cf. Timaeus 1+2 E 5-6. God is the best of causes and his work is good, of. 28 A 
6-B 1, 29 A 2-6, 29 E -30 B, etc.
73· Timaeus 2 9 E 1-2; Phaedrus' 21+7 A; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 983 A 2-1+.
7k-- Cf». Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1,9·21: ab utroque autem sciscitor cur mundi aedifi-
catores repente exstiterint, innumerabilla saecla dormierint; cf. Lucretius V.168-173; and 
see especially Pro dus, In Timaeum, vol. I, p.288_, 17-27 (Diehl). This kind of argument is 
atdeast as old as Parmenides^ (cf. Parmenides 28 B 8, 9-10, τι δ* αν μιν 
και χρέος &ρσεν ύστερον η ττράσθεν, του μηδενδς αρξάμενον, φυν; 
and- see my Parmenides [Princeton, 1965]? ΡΡ· 102 f.).
75· Cf. above note 3U.
76. Cf. Euthyphro 10 A-ll A.
77. Laws 818 A-E.
78. Cf. Laws 818 B 9-C 3, for the interpretation of which see Cherniss, I, pp.608-9.
79· Phaedrus 21+7 B-E.
80. Cf. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952), p.78? notel, and p.80.
81. Phaedrus 2l+9 C 5-6.. .... . .
82. Timaeus 1+6 E 1+.
83. Cf. Grube, Plato's Thought (London, 1935), p.l69; Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, 
pp. 38 and 280.
81+. Sophist 265 B-E. '
85. Poli·ti cus 2 70 A, 2 73 A-C.
86. Politicus 273 B-D.
87. Cf. Republic 507 C 6-8, 529 D-530 B (cf. also 532 C 1 with Shorey, Plato, The 
Republic, vol. II, p.199? note b).
88. Republic 530 A 5-7·
89. Cf. Gorgias 1+53 A.2 and E U-5 where Rhetoric is said to be ττειθους δημιουργός; 




90. De Generatione et Corruptione 336 B 27-3ii; this notion is the same as that implied 
by Plato in Timaeus 37 C-D (of. Cherniss, I, p.l|20 and notes 126 and 352).
91. Cf. Cherniss, I, pp. 609 f.
92. Timaeus 28 B 7»
93. Hackforth, Classical Quarterly, N,S. IX (1959), pp. l8f.
9k· Vlastos, Creation, pp. U02-lj.05.
95· Timaeus 28 B 6-7.
96. Timaeus 28 B U-C 2.
97. Vlastos, Creation, p. I|02.
98. Cf. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, II,i^, p. 793* The point had already 
been raised by Produs. In Timaeum, vol. I, pp. 283,27-285, 7 (Diehl).
99· Cf. Cherniss, I, note 36I·
100. Timaeus 30 A3»
101. Cf. Vlastos, Creation, pp. 1|03-1|θ5·
102. Cf. Timaeus 52 D 3~k,
103. Cf.Heinous, Epitomé XIV, 3 (Louis); Taurus, a£. Philoponus, De Aeternitate Mundi, 
pp. lU.5,8-114.7,13 (Rabe); Proclus, In Timaeum, vol. I, pp, 290,13-291,12 (Diehl); Asclepius,
In Nicomachi Isagogen I, γ , sub fin, (in my edition of this work which is still unpublished).
10i|. Solmsen (Aristotle's System of the Physical World [Ithaca, 19óOj,p.5l), while recog­
nizing that "there are definite reasons why Plato's cosmos should have no temporal beginning," 
says that "we have no right to give them more weight than did Plato himself and to set aside 
his unequivocal and emphatic statement that the Cosmos 'has come into being.!.i.The arguments 
for the eternity of the Cosmos become decisive only with his pupils." Solmsen (op.cit. p,50, 
note 111;) appears to think that Plato himself gives a warning against going beyond the myth 
when he says τον εΙκότα μύθον αηοδεχομevoυς τίρετίει toutou μηδέν ετι τΐερα £ητεΐν(29 D 2-3)·
I have given my reasons against such an interpretation of γεγονεν in 28 B 7· I would like to 
add that the fact that the mythical form may be intimately connected with a subject does not 
mean that we cannot derive conclusions that go beyond the myth. Moreover, we should disting­
uish in the Timaeus two things which "could be εικος : on the one hand we have the mythical ac­
count of creation, on the other the content of Timaeus' discourse about the physical world.
Now 29 D2-3 is Timaeus' conclusion from the fact that his discourse is about the universe which 
is a physical object and about which there can be only an εΙκός λόγος or μύθος ( cf. 29 B 3-D 3). 
An examination of the different passages where Plato uses these expressions will show that it 
is the content of the physical doctrines propounded by Timaeus that is declared to be "like­
ly," or as "likely" as any other, not the creation myth itself. Finally, that Plato was in­
terested in the question whether the universe had a beginning or not is shown by the Timaeus 
itself (cf. 27 C 5, Ü γεγονεν η και αγενες έστιν). For some plausible reasons why Plato 
adopted the mythical account for the Timaeus, cf. Friedlander, Platon, -~i? (Berlin, 196J1), pp. 
211-2 = Plato, vol. I (New York, 1956), p.200. See also in the English edition p.2J|8, a
passage which has apparently been omitted from the last German edition.
105. Cf. especially U6 D-E.
